![]() ![]() With this result in hand, I offer several snippets of advice and a host of principles in chapter 6 for assessing the hedonic value of states of affairs. ![]() In chapter 5 I argue that being hedonically better than is not a transitive relation. And even the pleasure of potential persons matters, I argue in chapter 4 the fact that a person would feel pleasure is a reason to create her. Hence, I have just as much basic reason to promote your hedonic well-being as mine. In chapter 3 I extend my argument in chapter 1 to the conclusion that pleasures and unpleasures have agent-neutral moral significance. ![]() so, their normative import doesn't derive from extrinsic motivational or affective conditions that their pleasantness or unpleasantless might be thought to consist in. But what type of value and disvalue do they have ? Experiences that are pleasant or unpleasant are intrinsically so. Moreover, similar considerations, as well as analogies, support thinking that all unpleasures are bad in some way and all pleasures are good in some way. Sentient experience, I suggest in chapter 1, provides key evidence for founding ethics: a severely painful experience gives its subject evidence that it's bad in some way. These tasks are interwoven, but principally, I support the theory in chapters 1-4, develop it in chapters 5 and 6, and apply it to a challenging cluster of problems in chapter 7. In this essay I support, develop and apply a theory of hedonic value. ![]()
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